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ABSTRACT 
 
Since Hurricane Katrina, targeting redevelopment has become the dominant municipal 
strategy for neighborhood and city-wide revitalization.  Since 2009, this strategy has been 
adopted and is currently being implemented by the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority in 
several New Orleans neighborhoods.  One such area includes the commercial corridor of the 
Central City neighborhood, Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard (OC Haley).   
 
This thesis describes and assesses NORA‘s strategy for revitalizing OC Haley with 
regards to impacts on Central City‘s economic development and affordable housing—two of the 
area‘s greatest challenges.  Although NORA‘s targeting strategy is proving effective in many 
respects, it is not without its limitations including creating a gentrifying environment.  To 
address this foreseeable impact, this thesis recommends the incorporation of a Community Land 
Trust (CLT) into NORA‘s Central City Strategy to aid in effectively revitalizing the 
neighborhood without compromising affordability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS:  Community development, Targeting, Gentrification, Community Land Trust, 
New Orleans Redevelopment Authority.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING THE ISSUES 
 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
  Motivated by city-wide plans and local planning initiatives, the availability of funding, 
and the impacts of 
Hurricane Katrina, the 
Oretha Castle Haley (OC 
Haley) corridor and the 
Central City neighborhood 
are beginning to see 
unprecedented activity and 
investment—an area that 
had long suffered from  a 
host of urban problems.  
This thesis aims to identify the interests and their strategies influencing the recovery of the OC 
Haley corridor and Central City, the progression that led to these interests, activities, and 
investments, and how these are affecting the recovery of the area in question.  From this general 
overview, this thesis focuses in on the strategy and actions of the New Orleans Redevelopment 
Authority (NORA).  This thesis is framed by the following questions:  
 What revitalization efforts are currently taking place in the Central City 
neighborhood and along the OC Haley corridor?  
 Who is working to realize this resulting vision and what strategy is being 
employed? 
 How were these visions and strategies formed? 
Fig. 1: Map of Neighborhoods in New Orleans 
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 In what ways is the strategy succeeding and/or failing?  
 How can the failures or weaknesses of this strategy be addressed?   
By answering these questions, this thesis will provide insight into the formulation and 
implementation of recovery efforts in Central City community and offer recommendation with 
regards to integrating and increasing the effectiveness of current recovery efforts.  The lessons 
gleaned from and the recommendations made within this thesis are intended to provide 
organizations and individuals involved in community redevelopment, particularly in New 
Orleans and in the Central City neighborhood, with a greater understanding of the possible 
impacts of current revitalization efforts as well as highlight an additional method to mitigate 
negative impacts of on-going initiatives and create a more holistic approach to aiding Central 
City in its recovery.  
INTRODUCTION TO CENTRAL CITY AND ORETHA CASTLE HALEY 
The New Orleans neighborhood of Central City can be defined as the area bound by St. 
Charles Avenue to the south, Louisiana 
Avenue to the west, the Pontchartrain 
Expressway to the east, and Toledano Street 
and Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard to the 
north.   The neighborhood is approximately 
two square miles and sits to the north of the 
Garden and Lower Garden District, to the west 
of the Central Business District, and to the east 
of the Broadmoor neighborhood (see Figure 
1).  As its name suggests, Central City is 
Fig. 2: Map of Neighborhoods in District 2 
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centrally located within the city of New Orleans.  Historically, the Central City neighborhood 
had been closely associated a variety of activities and uses, including  commerce, public housing, 
and African American culture.  Central City has a varied and rich history full of times of 
prosperity, times of distress and, more recently, times of revitalization.    
HISTORY OF THE AREA:  ORIGINS TO PRE-KATRINA  
Beginning in the 1830‘s, the Central City neighborhood was developed largely as 
speculative rental properties.  By the late 1800s, 95% of the structures making up Central City 
were rental-housing units.1  Although the demographics have shifted in Central City in terms of 
the ethnic group dominating the area, it has historically been a working class stronghold.  The 
housing stock is overwhelmingly rental units made affordable for largely working class 
residents.  The demographic shifts the neighborhood has undergone over the years has included a 
number of immigrant populations including German, Italian, Irish, and Jewish peoples, but has 
been comprised of an African American majority since the 1930s.2  Over time, these populations 
have largely and regularly served as domestics and skilled laborers for residents in the 
historically wealthier and primarily American adjacent district, the Garden District.   
Central City, like many neighborhoods, has a commercial corridor that has served as the 
economic backbone of the community, Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard (OC Haley).  OC Haley 
begins where Dryades Street ends at Jackson Avenue and continues for ten blocks northwest 
before ending at the Pontchartrain Expressway (see Figure 3).  At its height in the 1940s and 
1950s, the OC Haley corridor included over 200 businesses.  The reason for OC Haley‘s 
celebrated success as a commercial epicenter can be attributed to the time period of 
institutionalized racial discrimination in which African Americans were not allowed and other 
                                                          
1 GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖  June 23, 2004.  
<http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/2/61/snapshot.html> 
2 GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖   
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socially conscious consumers were 
unwilling to shop in historically white 
commercial districts, namely Canal 
Street bordering the French Quarter.3   
The late 1960s marked the beginning of 
OC Haley‘s decline as many 
commercial areas were forced to 
integrate and white flight sent customers 
to the suburbs.4 With this decline in 
commercial activity and integrated 
population, several trends began to 
emerge in the Central City area.  Central 
City saw increasing numbers of 
minority residents and residents with 
incomes at or below the poverty line.  The area also began to see incidents of increased crime 
and decreased property values.  To help change the image of the area, Melpomene Street became 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard in 1977 and OC Haley was given its current name, changing it 
from Dryades Street, in 1989.5  Despite the attempts to reinvigorate the area, urban decline has 
continued to plague OC Haley and the surrounding area into the 21st century.      
                                                          
3 GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖  June 23, 2004.  
<http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/2/61/snapshot.html> 
4 GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖ June 23, 2004.  
<http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/2/61/snapshot.html>   
5 Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004.  Page 6.   
Fig. 3: Map of Parcels along OC Haley Corridor 
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Fig. 4: Map of Percent of people living below twice the poverty 
threshold by census block group in Orleans Parish 
Fig. 5: Map of Percent African American Population by census 
block group in Orleans Parish 
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Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the OC Haley Corridor showed the typical signs of a 
distressed inner-city neighborhood.  Poverty, segregation, and lack of access to education, 
transportation, and employment have been negatively affecting this Central City area before the 
catastrophic storm in 2005.  In 2000, Central City had a population of 19,702 people made up of 
8,147 households, 4,016 of those households being families.6  This population was majority 
African American (87.1%) with whites making up the largest minority population (9.9%) and 
significantly smaller populations of Asian, Native American, Hispanics, and other categories (see 
Fig. 4).7  The Central City was overwhelmingly African American and just as overwhelmingly 
impoverished (see Fig. 5).  
2000 Census data shows half of Central City households lived in poverty compared to 
27.9% in Orleans Parish and 12.4% nationally.8  The average household income is about half that 
of Orleans Parish ($23,237 compared to $43,176).9  The data also show that most households in 
poverty are female householders with no husband present and with children under 18 (68.2% of 
the Central City population compared with the 44.4% national figure).10  In addition, poverty 
rates are higher across all age cohorts compared to their counterparts in the rest of Orleans 
Parish, the state of Louisiana, and nation-wide.11 Related to its poverty, Central City suffers from 
higher rates of unemployment and lower rates of educational attainment than the surrounding 
parishes, the state, and the nation. It is fair to say that prior to any hardships caused by Hurricane 
Katrina, Central City was a community suffering from issues of poverty, segregation, and 
                                                          
6 U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Full-count Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community 
Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org> 
7 Census 2000 Full-count Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. 
8 U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community 
Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org> 
9 Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. 
10 Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. 
11 U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community 
Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org> 
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inequity disproportionately compared to many other neighborhoods in New Orleans and 
throughout the country (See Figure 3).  
ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS:  THE CENTRAL CITY RENAISSANCE ALLIANCE 
Given the general state of Central City‘s population, the area is and has been for several 
decades in need of both economic and social stabilization.  These issues have been identified by 
professionals outside of the community as well as by the community itself and have been 
formally expressed in various planning documents.  Disinvestment, concentrations of poverty, 
proliferation of certain types of land uses, lack of recreational and green space, an absence of 
needed stores and services, and inadequate after school programs for youth had become 
characteristic of the Central City neighborhood.12  Efforts to address these concerns have 
surfaced since OC Haley‘s early days of decline in the 1960s including the renaming of streets in 
the 1970s and the formal assessing of the community‘s problems in the City of New Orleans 
1999 Land Use Plan.  These issues, were more clearly identified in a community planning 
initiative that took place the year before Hurricane Katrina.   
In its continued efforts to address the issues plaguing Central City, the City of New 
Orleans commissioned a community planning initiative, the ―Central City Renaissance Alliance 
Community Plan,‖ with support from the Ford Foundation, and spearheaded by Concordia 
Planning, LLC (Concordia).  Concordia representatives, local and national philanthropic 
partners, over 200 residents, and municipal partners participated in this planning effort together, 
forming the Central City Renaissance Alliance (CCRA).  Working together for eighteen months, 
the members of the CCRA participated in a communicative planning process that produced the 
Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.13   The result of these efforts was a plan to 
                                                          
12Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004.  Page 8.   
13 CCRA Website.  <http://myccra.org/#/about-ccra/4530391365> Accessed February 10, 2010.   
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―guide the City in delivering services and providing resources to address the community‘s 
needs.‖14  This plan, given its focus on community participation and involvement and the time 
period in which it was developed, provides a uniquely comprehensive and internal perspective on 
the needs and goals of Central City.  This concept is critical in considering plans conceived after 
Hurricane Katrina and, in turn, in assessing the recovery of the neighborhood.   
 With citizen participation being an integral component of the committee-based approach 
characterizing the methodology of the planning effort, the CCRA plan identified seven themes 
that organize the policy recommendations and actions including:  Strengthening Community 
Connections, Telling the Community Story, Housing in the Community, Community 
Beautification, Employing the Community and Community Wealth Building, An Educated 
Community, and A Healthy and Safe Community.15  Although each theme deals with specific 
sub-categories, many of the goals, actions, and recommendations within each theme directly 
impacts housing and/or economic development.  For example, the ―Strengthening Community 
Connections‖ includes creating a database of community businesses and reorganizing businesses 
to work cooperatively. In addition, a central goal in the ―Telling the Community Story‖ is 
developing cultural tourism by building upon the history of the OC Haley corridor and the 
traditions of the neighborhood.16  Housing and economic development are implicitly and 
explicitly the focus of the CCRA‘s plan.   
The main focus of the housing component of the CCRA plan includes managing 
gentrification and improving the quantity of decent, affordable housing.17  The first of these 
goals emerges from the concern that renewed economic interest and redevelopment of Central 
                                                          
14 Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004. Page 6.  
15 Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004.  Page 12.  
16 Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004.  Pages 12 and 21.   
17Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004.  Page 24.   
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City for middle and upper income families will create substantial price increases for housing and 
price out existing residents.  The plan also notes, however, that ―heightened demand for property 
within the neighborhood lays the foundation for community revitalization‖ and ―demand for 
retail and commercial enterprises improves the property tax base in the city.‖18  Thus, the task is 
to maintain affordable housing and the current Central City population while simultaneously 
encouraging investment and economic growth in the area.  One recommendation made by the 
CCRA to reduce the cost of homeownership and improve the sustainability of affordable housing 
is establishing a community land trust (CLT).19  This tool will be discussed at greater length in 
chapter four as the recommendation is still relevant today and may prove to fulfill the intended 
purpose laid out in the CCRA‘s 2004 plan.   
The other goal, to improve the quality of decent, affordable housing, is a response to a 
housing stock that is suffering from neglect.  In addition, the appearance of blighted homes and 
businesses detracts from the economic viability of the area as well as the quality of life for 
residents.  To combat this neglect, the CCRA recommends the community cooperate with 
volunteer organizations (such as Youth Build and AmeriCorps) already geared towards building 
maintenance and blight remediation to complete interior and exterior building defects with 
community members paying a fee that is subsidized by volunteer labor and financial support 
from foundations and other philanthropic sources.20   Ultimately, housing that is both affordable 
and of high-quality is an integral component in the CCRA‘s planning document as well as to the 
overall recovery of the Central City neighborhood.  Also integral to the neighborhood‘s 
revitalization and the CCRA‘s plan is economic development.   
                                                          
18 Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004. Page 25.  
19 Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004.  Page 25.   
20 Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004.  Page 25.  
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Three goals are identified under ―Employing the Community and Community Wealth 
Building:‖ create a job resource center, improve access to financial services and resources, and 
create an environment that supports new, small, and growing businesses.21  Additional goals 
related to economic development are found throughout the CCRA planning document including 
the already mentioned topic of reducing the appearance of blight as well as involving the 
community in Brownfield redevelopment.  None of the goals specifically discuss the OC Haley 
corridor, neither in terms of how the goals will be implemented in the corridor nor how the 
corridor could aid in realizing the goals.  Instead, the goals are more general and applicable to 
members of the community at-large rather than a specific area of the community.  The CCRA 
plan does make clear, however, that Central City‘s location, history, and local culture are all 
assets for the area to draw upon for economic development opportunities.  This theme as well as 
the housing needs identified by the CCRA is found in a number of plans that have been written 
since the CCRA‘s plan in response to Hurricane Katrina.  The contents and commonalities of 
these plans are discussed below.  The purpose of this discussion is to identify generally the 
intentions of planning efforts prior to Hurricane Katrina in Central City to provide some context 
for the current activities taking place in Central City that effect these areas of recovery.   
RECENT TRENDS:  THE POST-KATRINA PICTURE 
Painting a statistical picture of the Central City population post-Hurricane Katrina is 
problematic due to the difficulty of collecting or obtaining accurate data in the wake of the 2005 
disaster.  Given what information is available, however, it appears there has been little change in 
the Central City neighborhood with regards to residing population.  Since Hurricane Katrina, 
                                                          
21 Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖  2004.  Page 37.   
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Orleans Parish, as a whole, has become increasingly wealthy, white, and educated.22  However, it 
is less likely that the Parish-wide demographic shifts affected Central City as significantly as 
neighborhoods in which there were lower rates of returning residents given the neighborhood-
level data that is available such as average household income which held at $26,826—
comparable to pre-Hurricane Katrina statistics.23  In addition, between 70 and 79% of Central 
City residents are actively receiving mail at pre-Hurricane Katrina homes. 24   Given the 
information available,  Central City‘s current population shares characteristics similar to the 
area‘s pre-Hurricane Katrina population  making it likely that the current demographics of 
Central City strongly resembles its 2000  demographics (see Appendices A-E).  It follows that 
the community faces similar issues prior to Hurricane Katrina.  
Central City embodies a disproportionate numbers of poverty-stricken households and 
suffers from the problems that have, unfortunately, become associated with and characterize 
many inner-city neighborhoods.   One major consequence for residents of poor urban 
neighborhoods is that they become increasingly disconnected from the opportunities and general 
prosperity of their larger metropolitan regions.25  The negative impacts do not become isolated to 
these neighborhoods.  In fact, strong disparities among neighborhoods affect the overall health of 
metropolitan economics and ―lagging central cities act as a drag on the totality of regional 
                                                          
22 Plyer, Alison and Elaine Ortiz. ―Who lives in New Orleans and the Metro Area now?‖  Based on 2008 U.S. 
Census Bureau Data.    Greater New Orleans Community Data Center.  Released: October 2, 2009, Pages 2 and 6.   
23 Point 2 Homes.  ―Demographics for Zip Code 70114.‖ 
<http://homes.point2.com/Neighborhood/US/Louisiana/Orleans-Parish/New-Orleans/Central-City-
Demographics.aspx.> February 5, 2010.   
24 Percent Recovery by Neighborhood in New Orleans, June 30, 2009, GNOCDC. GNO Community Data Center 
analysis of Valassis Residential and Business Database. 
View repopulation data by census block at www.gnocdc.org/repopulation/. 
25Krumholz, Norman.  ―Metropolitan Development and Neighborhood Revitalization.‖  Revitalizing Urban 
Neighborhoods.  Keating, Dennis W., Norman Krumholz and Philip Star.  University Press of Kansas:  1996.  Page 
214.  
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economic growth.‖26  Given the interconnectedness of neighborhood and metropolitan well-
being and the pervasiveness of this problem throughout Central City, it is crucial that this 
neighborhood be stabilized and the methods used to achieve this end be carefully studied. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
The issue of affordable housing is not one specific to Central City, however, it has 
arguably disproportionately affected this community.  Central City‘s population and housing 
stock is more vulnerable to the increases in housing costs post-Katrina.27 Despite the attention 
given to the affordable housing issue in recent years and the strong economy during the 1990s, 
the affordable housing crisis in the United States has only worsened—from 1991 to 1999, the 
number of families paying more than 50 percent of their income for rent rose by 600,000, an 
increase of 12 percent.28  By 1999, these ―worst case housing needs‖ renters totaled at least 4.9 
million households, a record according to HUD.  With the slowing of the economy and a rising 
unemployment rate in the past 10 years, these figures have only worsened.  According to the 
National Housing Conference, more than 4 million working families lived in decent housing but 
spent more than half of their income for rent or mortgages in 2001—representing a 30 percent 
increase from 1999 and a 68 percent jump from 1997.29    
Major changes in the economy and the population further complicate the affordable 
housing challenge.  Shifts in industry location and type are creating sprawling jobs, sprawling 
housing patterns, redefining individuals‘ and families‘ housing needs, and creating stark 
socioeconomic differences between regions and populations.30  Specifically, 2000 census data 
                                                          
26 Krumholz, Norman.  ―Metropolitan Development and Neighborhood Revitalization.‖  Page 215.  
27 GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖  June 23, 2004.  
<http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/2/61/snapshot.html> 
28 ―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies:  Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖  Page 2.   
29 ―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies:  Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖  Page 2.   
30 ―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies:  Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖  Page 2.   
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confirms that the majority of job and housing growth is occurring in the Western and Southern 
parts of the country as well as in the suburbs compared to the country‘s Midwestern, 
Northeastern, and urban counterparts.  In addition, suburbs are becoming increasingly populated 
by minority groups, the result of increased African-American mobility in the 1990s, and are 
generally inhabited by young singles and older Americans living alone versus the traditional 
nuclear family, which is generally shrinking.31 
The implications of these changes, with regards to affordable housing, is that the problem 
must be considered in the context of current and future needs—not in a vacuum.  Affordable 
housing policies, programs, and incentives must, in turn, reflect these changes or be flexible with 
regards to adjusting to them.   Critics of current programs and other attempts to combat 
affordable housing maintain that, ―across the nation, state and local government leaders and their 
partners—in the corporate, civic, real estate, and nonprofit communities—are struggling to 
implement an array of affordable housing and homeownership programs to better meet the needs 
of low-income and working families.‖32  New Orleans does not escape this criticism and is 
perhaps even more egregious in its inability to meet affordable housing needs. 
New Orleans has undergone many changes in response to Hurricane Katrina in ways that 
severely impact the supply and demand of the housing stock.  In Post-Katrina New Orleans, 
single-person households are on the rise (from 27 percent in 2000 to 31 percent in 2008).33  
Along these lines, New Orleans also has fewer families with children (declining from 33 percent 
of all households in 2000 to 27 percent in 2008).34  These statistics are consistent with research 
that indicates that families with children are more likely to leave disaster-ravaged areas.    This 
                                                          
31 ―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies:  Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖  Page 2.   
32 ―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies:  Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖  Page 1.   
33 Plyer, Alison.  et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖  Greater New Orleans 
Community data Center and The Urban Institute.  November 2009.  Page 6.     
34 Plyer, Alison, et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖   Page 6.   
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newly emerging population has significant implications for the type, size, and location of 
housing that is needed.   
Occurring simultaneously with this shifting population is a change in home ownership 
rates, which are increasing significantly across the metropolitan area (from 61 percent in 2000 to 
67 percent in 2008).35 The comparison of these numbers to the number of households in New 
Orleans suggests that homeowners are returning to the city in larger numbers than renters.  The 
GNOCDC report on housing production needs attributes this to the ―preponderance of federal 
dollars allocated to rebuilding owner-occupied housing rather than rental housing.‖36  The 
increase in homeownership continued despite rising housing costs.  Rising housing costs for 
renters, however, rose more than 3 times that of homeowners (27 percent) from 2004 to 2008.37  
During this time, median gross monthly rent rose from $702 to $892.38  The 2008 increases are 
well above comparable cities such as Baltimore, Memphis, or Milwaukee.  The most 
burdensome increases, according to the GNOCDC, were among renters earning $20,000 to 
$35,000.  Households with this annual income are considered low income and are often eligible 
for subsidized low-income housing tax credit units (LIHTC units) to be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 5.39   
The importance of these figures is not solely to make the point that housing affordability 
has been problematic for a portion of the New Orleans population following Katrina, but also 
that the availability of affordable housing has and will continue to dictate the way in which New 
Orleans recovers.  Thus, the issue of affordable housing is central to the revitalization of New 
Orleans, particularly neighborhoods that are vulnerable to shifts in the housing market.  For this 
                                                          
35 Plyer, Alison, et. al.  ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖  Page 7.  
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reason it is important that the revitalization of Central City include some sustainable affordable 
housing component, otherwise the neighborhood will never be revitalized.   
HYPOTHESIS 
NORA‘s strategy for redeveloping the OC Haley corridor, although influenced by a 
series of planning initiatives started immediately prior to Hurricane Katrina on the neighborhood 
planning level to city-wide post-Hurricane Katrina recovery plans, is directly tied to the city‘s 
target area strategy.  The NORA strategy is rooted in the theoretical community development 
strategy of targeting.  Although the effects of the strategy‘s implementation remain to be seen as 
it is too early to make any definitive conclusions about overall effectiveness of NORA‘s 
approach, there are some predictable outcomes based upon the historical context and makeup of 
the neighborhood, the more general economic climate and policy frameworks, and the outcomes 
of similar strategies already implemented and studied.  The effect of the strategy of greatest 
concern is that of gentrification.   
 Gentrification will signify both an improvement of the area as well as an inability to sustain 
the current population.  There are, however, many avenues for addressing this issue and 
maintaining affordability for current and returning residents that should be strongly considered 
by NORA in moving forward with their strategy.  This recommendation is the establishment of 
Community Land Trusts, a land use tool that is able to keep property values affordable through 
ownership by an organization with a charitable purpose.40  By incorporating a mechanism for 
maintaining affordability in the OC Haley corridor targeting strategy, NORA can achieve real 
improvements for the area as well as ensure that current residents are recipients of those 
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improvements by actively seeing that current residents are not displaced and have the option to 
stay in the improving area.   
NORA‘s strategy is in its early days of implementation and thus its outcomes are largely 
unknown.  It remains to be seen if the current projects will be completed, if completed projects 
will have any enduring success, and what the impact will be on the community at-large.    
Although this thesis attempts to predict the likely outcomes of implementing NORA‘s strategy 
based upon the past implementation of similar strategies, the unique nature of New Orleans and 
the post-Hurricane Katrina environment compound the difficulty of such an attempt.  However, 
NORA‘s strategy is one familiar to municipalities and communities across the country and its 
theoretical origins and real-world implications have been thoroughly investigated and will be 
heavily drawn upon to comment upon the future state of OC Haley and Central City as a result of 
the actions of NORA.  Although specific outcomes may not be reasonably predicted, general 
impacts created by the NORA strategy and possible methods of mitigating undesirable impacts 
are the limits of the research contained within this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2:  STRATEGIES FOR REVITALIZATION 
 
NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION:  GENERAL PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICES 
NORA‘s strategy, at its core, seeks to engage private interests in investing in an area.  
NORA is strategically investing limited funds into a neighborhood through visible projects as a 
means of stimulating the investment of additional, private monies.  In addition, these projects are 
aimed to serve both the interests of NORA as well as those of the neighborhood‘s residents.  
With these constraints, NORA has carefully selected economic development projects along a 
strategic corridor, OC Haley.  NORA‘s strategy is not unusual.  In fact, it is well-aligned to the 
revitalization framework of the past decade:  neoliberal communitarianism.  
Neoliberal communitarianism is market-based and seeks shared interests between 
residents of neighborhoods in need of revitalization and the larger society they exist within.41  
The market-based component of this definition describes the neoliberal aspect of this framework 
which, as described by Michael Porter, argues that ―a sustainable economic base can be created 
in inner cities only as it has been elsewhere: through private, for-profit initiatives, and 
investments based on economic self-interest and genuine competitive advantage.‖42  The 
communitarianism component ―mirrors consensus-based organizing, in that the assumption is of 
shared interests‖ to the extent in which it assumes that ―individual gains and interests in the 
community are synonymous with collective, or community, gains and interests‖ and that 
―communities are function of, and defined by, the attributes and relationship of people within 
them.‖43   
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2004.  Page 55.   
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 Neoliberal communitarianism is descriptive of NORA‘s strategy in Central City and its 
weaknesses can help explain the obstacles facing NORA.  The weakness of neoliberal 
communitarianism is that it does not allow for both the increased control of low-income residents 
over their communities while also allowing for equitable improvement of low-income 
communities.44  These outcomes are rooted in several breaks from the theoretical roots in 
practice within both the neoliberal and communitarianism components of the framework.  Within 
neoliberal thinking the faulty assumptions are that the interests of capital are synonymous with 
the interests of communities, that there is fair competition within capitalism when it has shown to 
produce winners and losers, and that investment from the outside can be controlled by residents 
inside the investment areas.45 These assumptions carry over to the communitarianism portion of 
the framework.  First, communitarianism assumes that ―individual gains and interests are the 
same as those of the larger community,‖ that ―people in a community share common interests 
simply by virtue of livening in the same area,‖ and that communities are ―products of the 
attributes of the people within them.‖46  In sum, neoliberal communitarianism assumes that there 
is no conflict between interests with regards to community revitalization.  These assumptions 
result in real obstacles and problems that arise with implementing a strategy rooted in neoliberal 
communitarianism such as that of targeting, the strategy adopted by NORA.   
TARGETING: ORIGINS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Targeting can generally be defined as the strategic investment of limited resources to 
revitalize a specified geographic area.47  Typically, resources tend to be public monies and the 
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specific geographic area is a distressed, low-income urban area.48  Galster et al. (2006) question 
the ability of the targeting strategy to trigger the revitalization of struggling, inner-city 
neighborhoods as they examine Richmond, Virginia‘s use of a spatially targeted Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) for revitalizing seven of the city‘s unstable neighborhoods.  
The authors‘ question whether or not there is an investment threshold that will provide the right 
conditions for qualitative neighborhood improvement.  Using an adjusted interrupted time series 
model, Galster et al. find targeting strategies can be effective in improving neighborhoods and 
that there is a threshold of investment that will result in neighborhood improvement as measured 
by increased property values.  
The Richmond study holds both hope for targeting to prove effective in New Orleans as 
well as the neighborhoods targeted in Richmond, like Central City, are described as distressed 
with ―higher-than-citywide percentages of persons in poverty, female-headed households, and 
vacant and renter-occupied property.‖49  The development authority in Richmond, like NORA, 
primarily utilized CDBG money to ―achieve a critical mass that stimulates self-sustaining private 
market activity.‖50    Galster et al. examined the effect of concentrated public spending on 
property values within census tracts and revealed that investment that exceeds a medium 
expenditure per census tract ($20,100) led to increased property values.51  This outcome is 
lauded as a great success particularly given the minimal displacement of residents due to the 
following factors specific to the targeted Richmond neighborhoods:  ―(1) high initial vacancy 
rates; (2) emphasis on infill construction, using vacant lots, and upgrading of dwellings by 
incumbent owners; and (3) housing counseling provided through [a special municipal service 
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implemented along with the targeting plan].‖52  Targeting, as Galster et al. demonstrate, can 
revitalize neighborhoods, however, at a cost.  This cost includes the initial funding needed to 
improve the neighborhood (which is significant) as well as the cost that is passed along to current 
residents in the form of increased property values and general cost of living.  This secondary cost 
provides an environment for gentrification.   
 
GENTRIFICATION AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GENTRIFICATION 
There is no consensus on the definition of gentrification.  There is, however, general 
agreement about the way in which this phenomenon manifests itself within a community.  The 
term was apparently coined by Ruth Glass in 1964:  
One by one, many of the working-class quarters of London 
have been invaded by the middle classes—upper and lower.  
Shabby, modest mews and cottages—two room up and tow 
down—have been taken over, when their leases have 
expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. 
Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent 
period—which were used as lodging houses or were 
otherwise in multiple occupation—have been upgraded 
once again…Once this process of ―gentrification‖ starts in 
a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original 
working class occupiers are displaced and the whole social 
character of the district is changed.53 
 
Gentrification, for the purpose of this thesis, will refer to the development in lower-
income areas that results in a pattern of higher rents and land house values that cause the 
displacement of existing renters and owner-occupiers by making the area unaffordable.  
Gentrification will also include the definition specified by secondary displacement in which 
public spending programs in one area attracts the eye of private market speculators and 
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gentrifiers with the resultant displacement of the original residents.54  Generally the process of 
gentrification is one in which a population residing in an area is pushed out by an increasing cost 
of living and is replaced by a population that can afford to live in this appreciating environment.  
This process is most often found to include the movement of lower-income minority populations 
out of an area and a higher-income white and often younger population into the area. 
A study of gentrification in Harlem revealed significant increases in per capita income 
and median contract data in the 1980s—a distinct change in data from the prior decade.55  The 
cause of the gentrification of Harlem is found to be increased investment in specific areas of the 
neighborhood.  In the 1980s, areas in Harlem were targeted by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) as a Neighborhood Strategy Area as well as by Harlem Urban 
Development Corporation and other various City agencies for developing public housing and 
local businesses.  Projects initiated by these entities led to the multi-million dollar development 
ventures in the private housing market.56  Although initial investments were aimed at lower-
income residents, the statistical demographic representative of the area, the investment spurred 
by this targeted approach was intended to capture middle and upper-income citizens.57  As the 
case of Harlem illustrates, gentrification is a concern not only for general investment in an area, 
but must be taken into consideration even when investing for lower-income and presently 
residing citizens is the focus of the targeting strategy.        
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OTHER STRATEGIES:  APPLICABILITY AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Other strategies exist to effectively revitalize distressed urban areas with different effects 
than those found in targeting.  Plans that incorporate heavy community participation components 
and plans that embrace the recommendation of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders (Kerner Commission) and subsequent involvement of Community Development 
Corporations (CDC) as well as incorporating community participation make up a few alternative 
approaches that have had success in redeveloping struggling neighborhoods and whose lessons 
can offer something to NORA in the way of increasing their effectiveness in Central City.  
Specifically, revitalization efforts that consider the needs of the community in a holistically and 
embrace the opinions and views of the community can prove effective in accomplishing 
revitalization goals.    
Community participation in which neighborhoods have decision-making authority is one 
alternative method in which neighborhoods can be revitalized.  Susan Fainstein and Clifford 
Hirst found this to be the case in their 1995 study on the Neighborhood Revitalization Program 
(NRP) in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  In this case study, neighborhoods apply for NRP money 
(made available through Tax Increment Financing) and, in turn, implement the programs, 
incentives, or developments the neighborhood‘s community wants.58  Although this model 
presents challenges with regards to competition between neighborhoods, unrepresentative 
community representation, and parochialism, the model provides a balance between the need for 
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economic investment and development and issues of neighborhood health, residential 
affordability, and quality of life.59    
Yet another strategy that can effectively revitalize urban neighborhoods is the 
community-based approach.  Such approaches, as defined by Norman Krumholz in his article, 
―Metropolitan Development and Neighborhood Revitalization,‖ adhere to the guidelines 
identified by the 1968 Kerner Commission as a foundation for bringing together viable 
community-based organizations and led by a neighborhood advocacy organization or CDC.  
Formed by the Johnson Administration to address the issues of race riots, the Kerner 
Commission rejected the choice between ―empowering poor people and revitalizing distressed 
places.‖60  Instead, the Kerner Commission found that both types of assistance are necessary to 
truly improve urban neighborhoods and connect the inhabitants of distressed neighborhoods with 
housing, jobs and opportunity.  Krumholz argues for a neighborhood advocacy organization or 
CDC as such entities are uniquely positioned to ―upgrade neighborhoods while protecting the 
interest of low-income owners and renters.‖61   The implementing agency should then seek out 
other organizations that 
May also be the key to encouraging private neighborhood 
investment and maintaining support for key institutional actors 
whose decisions are vital to neighborhood revitalization.  Such 
institutions as hospitals, universities, banks, and other 
commercial businesses can use their resources and institutional 
power to sway governmental decisions, bolster the real estate 
market, and create neighborhood confidence. 62   
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The power of bringing together these various institutions, Krumholz argues, is that their 
combined forces can help improve not only the quality of life within the defined area, but 
actually aid residents in gaining greater control over the direction of their community and their 
place within it.  In this way, both the neighborhood and the residing citizens experience the 
benefits of revitalization efforts.  NORA‘s strategy could benefit greatly by embracing the 
ideological underpinning separating the Kerner Report from previous understandings of urban 
development.  Specifically, NORA‘s strategy is a place-based strategy, focusing on the physical 
improvements of the area.  Given the concern of affordability and gentrification, NORA could 
embrace additional place-based strategies that are aimed at a specific population—namely 
affordable housing for current low-income residents.  Affordable housing is not only a current 
concern for New Orleans‘s residents, particularly low-income residents, but is an issue that will 
only become increasingly problematic in Central City given the nature of targeting strategies to 
increase property values. 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE NORA APPROACH 
 
THE HISTORY OF NORA AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE OC HALEY STRATEGY 
The New Orleans Redevelopment Authority, originally named the Community 
Improvement Agency (CIA), was created through state enabling legislation in 1968 with the 
passage of the Community Improvement Act of 1968.63  The agency was created to address 
issues of abandonment and blight in the city of New Orleans.  Although the CIA was intended to 
be an organization free from political influences and significant oversight with regards to urban 
revitalization efforts in New Orleans, the CIA was a largely ineffectual agency—its budget was 
limited, its leadership was controlled by the mayor‘s office, and its authority dependent upon the 
support of the City Council.   
The CIA was formed under Mayor Victor Schiro.  Schiro advocated for the creation of 
the CIA and convinced City Hall to support it by assuring City Council members that the 
agency‘s ―decision-making powers rested largely with officials at City Hall.‖64  Schiro had the 
authority to appoint the CIA‘s seven-member board and ―stacked it with political insiders, rising 
black leaders, and businessmen with heavy investments in New Orleans real estate.‖65  This 
board, all men, all had ties to either development, construction, or the populous black areas.  In 
this way, the CIA had become a tool of the mayor that would provide an avenue for gaining 
support from black voters with relatively little financial or political costs.  With oversight from 
City Hall and the mayor‘s office as well as divided interest amongst board members, the CIA 
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was limited in becoming a major player in the redevelopment process of New Orleans‘ 
neighborhoods.  By 1972, the CIA had ownership of sixty properties (largely located in the 
Lower Ninth Ward), had a staff of five people, and was mostly counseling homeowners about 
how to rehabilitate their homes.66  Although Urban Renewal money and projects were underway 
during this time in New Orleans, the CIA was playing a very minor role in the decision-making 
or implementing of Urban Renewal plans.      
In 1984, the CIA gained the authority of expropriation.67  Under Mayor Marc Morial‘s 
administration, the CIA was the focus of restructuring.  During this period of restructuring the 
agency became known by its current name and, although struggling to receive funding and 
influence, its tools for blight remediation were enhanced including an expedited process for 
blight determinations and improved code enforcement.   By 2001, NORA had established itself 
as an effective and independent agency and had gained credibility as seen in its budget increases 
from $400,000 in 1999 to $850,000 by 2001.  NORA‘s developing finances and authority have 
continued to grow as has its interconnectedness with City Hall.     
In 2001, NORA began to use its right of reversion under its new Real Estate Acquisition and 
Land-banking Mechanism (REALM) program.  The idea motivating the creation of the program 
was that NORA would be able to actively spur development in areas deemed less-desirable to 
private interests.  The REALM program would focus on three neighborhoods:  Central City, St. 
Roch, and the Lower 9th Ward. NORA ran into immediate issues.  Budget shortfalls, an 
evaluation of the program by incoming mayor Ray Nagin, and, slightly later, Hurricane Katrina 
all slowed and eventually put a stoppage to the programs.  These issues are symptomatic of the 
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larger issues that have plagued NORA prior to Hurricane Katrina.  In 2005, prior to the storm, 
NORA‘s staff included only five employees.  In addition, NORA was a relatively passive agency 
only acting when a citizen or private interest would engage the agency about a particular 
property or groups of properties.68  Although NORA‘s efforts to revitalize the identified 
distressed neighborhoods had taken a backseat in the years immediately prior to Hurricane 
Katrina, since Hurricane Katrina, NORA has began to reestablish itself and its agenda.  This has 
been due to, in part, the various plans that have developed since the storm.     
Since Hurricane Katrina, numerous plans have been developed across the city from a variety 
of interest groups that affect Central City and the OC Haley corridor including: the Bring New 
Orleans Back plan (BNOB), the Lambert Plan, the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP), and the 
Office of Recovery Management Target Area Plans (Target Plan).  These plans, unlike the 
CCRA, are aimed at the recovery of the neighborhood in response to Hurricane Katrina and not 
the pre-Katrina conditions of the area.  Plans formed after Hurricane Katrina also vary with 
regards to community input, compared to the CCRA plan as well as to each other.  All of these 
plans, however, utilize targeting strategies as a means for revitalizing the Central City 
community.  Specifically, The BNOB plan proposed a systemic shrinking of the city‘s footprint 
to focus development based upon two designating criteria: immediate opportunity areas and 
neighborhood planning areas.  The first being areas to which residents could immediately return 
and begin rebuilding the city in the neighborhood model the BNOB plan recommends, the other 
being areas in which recovery may not occur to the extent that the area would be returned to its 
pre-Katrina state or that it would even be inhabitable.69  The Lambert Plan for Central City 
Neighborhood Planning District 2 Rebuilding Plan provided the basis, along with similar plans 
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for forty-nine other neighborhoods in New Orleans, for the UNOP plan.  On June 25, 2006, the 
Louisiana Recovery Authority unanimously accepted the UNOP as the basis for city recovery—
allowing the plan to be eligible for federal grants to enable implementation.70 With regards to 
Central City, the plan emphasizes the need to provide quality, affordable housing as well as 
capitalize on the area‘s proximity to the Central Business District and the Garden District and 
historically and culturally significant assets to encourage economic development—echoing the 
goals of the CCRA plan.71   
The Lambert Plan provides even more specific economic development recommendations 
that focus on the OC Haley corridor as a ―catalyst for economic growth and cultural education‖ 
and taking advantage of being formally accepted as a Main Street project.72  The strong promise 
for OC Haley held in the Lambert Plan does not quite carry over to the UNOP plan as economic 
development recommendations effecting the corridor are rated low and moderate in terms of 
their recovery value.  These projects, respectively, include the expansion of the Arts District and 
the Commercial Corridor Revitalization Program.73  These plans all identify the need for 
economic development in Central City and all, to varying degrees, recommend the focused 
investment of resources.  None of these plans have been directly implemented in the area, but 
their influences are felt as these plans have provided the background and progression to NORA‘s 
actions along OC Haley and in Central City.  
During the formulation of the plans discussed above, NORA was identified as a possible 
authority to spearhead the redevelopment of New Orleans as the agency held unique powers of 
expropriation, to issue bonds, and to buy and sell property.    
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With the creation of the Road Home Program (RHP) in 
2006, state lawmakers were looking for local agencies—
particularly in devastated New Orleans—with the ability 
to absorb the expected influence of state-owned 
properties.74 
 Despite the early insights that NORA may lead recovery efforts in New Orleans, the 
mayor‘s office was ultimately the lead agency.  Mayor Nagin‘s recovery czar, Edward Blakely, 
streamlined recovery efforts within City Hall and established the designation of recovery ―target 
area‖ around the city.  The strategy behind the ORM‘s Target Areas plan, as described by 
Blakely is that "the 
development zones will spur 
activity from investors.  When 
one area starts to do well, 
investors will want to invest 
nearby. This will allow the city 
to redevelop wisely and will 
help residents make smart 
choices about where to 
rebuild."75  Target Areas have 
been organized into three categories defining different kinds of recovery: Re-Build, Re-Develop, 
and Re-New.  The OC Haley corridor has been designated a Re-New district.  Re-New Districts 
refer to areas that call for aid with specific projects and ―that require relatively modest public 
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intervention in order to supplement work already underway by the private and nonprofit 
sector.‖76   
 The shared interest in 
Central City expressed in the 
ORM‘s Target Recovery Area 
plan and NORA‘s OC Haley 
revitalization strategy is no 
coincidence. In September of 
2008, in an attempt to smooth 
over some of the differences 
between NORA and City Hall, 
Blakely negotiated a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) between the two entities in which 
residential neighborhoods surrounding the commercial target areas, Hosing Opportunity Zones, 
would be given preference for NORA and city housing programs.77   
  In the years immediately following Hurricane Katrina, NORA was changing drastically 
from the small, passive, and largely unknown entity into a large and growing effective 
redevelopment authority.  NORA‘s staff now includes over forty members, has title to over 
10,000 properties, and has been the recipient of tens of millions of dollars in state and federal 
grants.78  NORA actively seeks end-users for properties, creates interest in distressed 
neighborhoods, and executes redevelopment plans the agency has created.  The change NORA 
has undergone is significant, but the agency is still sensitive to the authority of City Hall and the 
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City Council as NORA faces tremendous pressure to maintain the credibility it has achieved.  
NORA‘s strategy in Central City illustrates the careful balance NORA is seeking to achieve 
between revitalizing an area without overstepping perceived boundaries of authority. 
ON THE GROUND:  ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION 
NORA‘s strategy for Central City includes two distinct components: facilitating 
commercial revitalization along the OC Haley corridor and reducing residential blight 
throughout Central City. 79  The basis of 
NORA‘s strategy is the general idea that 
public resources can be directed and 
leveraged to trigger private investment and, 
in turn, revitalize neighborhoods.  NORA is 
in a unique position to have access to such 
resources and the authority to determine 
where and to whom such resources should 
be directed—within the framework set forth 
by the city.  As a result, NORA has 
developed a plan to revitalize the Central 
City neighborhood by focusing on the 
economic development of the 
neighborhood‘s main commercial corridor, OC Haley.  Through the use of CDBG funds, NORA 
has a budget of at least $2,000,000 for the specific use of commercial development along the OC 
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Haley corridor.80  NORA had set up an application process for individuals to receive grant 
money, revolving loans, and low interest loans to develop a commercial property along the 
corridor.  Applications were due in February of 2009.  According to NORA Project Manager 
Sam Saia, ―The application process is completed and the final financing is wrapping up for 
ground to break in the coming months.‖81     
NORA has selected fourteen projects along the OC Haley corridor to execute its targeting 
strategy.  The commercial entities include restaurants, various creative arts uses, demographic-
specific housing, and retail.  The criteria for selecting applicants rested largely from the financial 
viability of the project and whether the project was deemed to be a positive contribution to the 
community and current businesses.  In essence, projects with unsecured or minimal sources of 
funding as well as projects that included end uses that were considered undesirable community 
businesses were less likely to be selected.82  The geographic clustering of selected projects can 
be seen in Figure 10.  
Each project will receive between $100,000 and $500,00083 to assist with acquisition, 
architecture and engineering, and public facility improvements.84  The money provided by 
NORA is intended to be used as filler for a funding gap, not the main source of funding as 
projects should be considered viable without the added NORA assistance.  A detailed table 
communicating the specific business, funding amount, and address can be found below 
 
                                                          
80 New Orleans Redevelopment Authority.  ―Request for Proposals and Notice of Funds Availability for 
Redevelopment of Commercial Structures on Oretha Castle Haley Corridor.‖ 
81 Sam Saia.  Personal Interview. March 22, 2010.   
82 Sam Saia.  Personal Interview. March 22, 2010.  
83 Sam Saia. Personal Interview. March 25, 2010.  
84 NORA Program: Requests for Proposals.  ―Request for Proposals and Notes of Fund Availability for 
Redevelopment of Commercial Structure on Oretha Castle Haley Corridor Conduct by New Orleans Redevelopment 
Authority (NORA).‖   <http://www.noraworks.org/rfp/O%20C%20%20Haley%20Commercial%20RFP.pdf> 
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Project
85
 Address Funding from 
NORA 
Bennett Café 1626-1628 OC Haley Blvd.  $500,000 
Bennachin Restaurant 1817 OC Haley Blvd. $100,000 
Restaurant, Jazz Club, and Bar 1332 OC Haley Blvd. $250,000 
Coffee Shop 1618 OC Haley Blvd. $100,000 
Ashe‘ Art Park 1712 OC Haley Blvd. $349,685 
Live Performing Arts Venue, Restaurant 
and Bar  
1427 OC Haley Blvd. **Financial 
package 
undetermined.  
Johnson Burkett Senior Housing 
Cooperative and Mixed Use Facility 
1626-1628 OC Haley Blvd. $500,000 
Café Reconcile 1631 OC Haley Blvd. $500,000 
Masonic Temple Renovation 1421 OC Haley Blvd. **Financial 
package 
undetermined.  
Retail and Goodwork Network 
Headquarters 
2016 OC Haley Blvd. $150,000 
National Performance Network 1436 OC Haley Blvd. **Financial 
package 
undetermined.  
Retail and Mixed Use Facility 1613-1617 OC Haley Blvd. $250,000 
Commercial Space and NORA 
Headquarters 
1610 OC Haley Blvd. $250,000 
Mixed Use Facility 1400 OC Haley Blvd. $500,000 
 
The overall investment from NORA into the OC Haley Corridor is tentatively well over 
$3,000,000—above the budget initially indicated as part of the general application information.  
Although each financial package is specific to the project, most projects are receiving low 
interest revolving loans.  This financing mechanism will allow NORA to recuperate its funding 
over time in order to be able to continually invest and reinvest in projects along the corridor 
eventually building a critical mass and providing a strong economic base for the corridor to 
become self-sustaining.86    
                                                          
85 NORA Program: Requests for Proposals Request for Proposals and Notes of Fund Availability for Redevelopment 
of Commercial Structure on Oretha Castle Haley Corridor Conduct by New Orleans Redevelopment Authority 
(NORA).‖ 
86 Melissa Ehlinger.  Personal Interview.  May 10, 2010.  
Fig. 9: Table of projects selected for NORA OC Haley targeting strategy 
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NORA‘s initial financial commitment is likely to spur revitalization in the Central City 
neighborhood.  Given Galster et. al.‘s (1996) assessment of effective thresholds of funding 
(investment that exceeds a medium expenditure per census tract, e.g. $20,100 in the Richmond, 
Virginia case study),87 NORA‘s investment is well above that threshold and as such has provided 
the economic catalyst to see real improvements in the neighborhood such as those measured in 
the Richmond study (e.g. increased property values).  NORA‘s target area includes six census 
tracts within Orleans Parish (67, 68, 79, 80, 84, and 85) and investment is anticipated to be 
beyond the initially designated two million dollars, bringing the average expenditure per census 
track to over $300,000 as a low projection.88  Unlike the Richmond example, however, it is not 
clear that the tangible benefits such as increased property values would not have some negative 
effects on the current population residing within the targeted area.  Although the OC Haley and 
Central City neighborhood and the NORA strategy share some of the qualities that minimized 
the encroachment and impacts of gentrification, the current NORA strategy is vulnerable to the 
proliferation and adverse effects of gentrification because there is little in the strategy to actively 
combat this secondary effect.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
87 Galster, et. al ―Targeting Investments for Neighborhood Revitalization.‖    Page 464.   
88 U.S. Census Bureau.  American Fact Finder online tool.  Accessed May 3, 2010. 
<http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/TMGeoSearchByListServlet?ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&_lang=en&_ts=29
2777414544>  
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ON THE GROUND:  AFFORDABLE HOUSING  
   NORA‘s interests and activities are not limited to the OC Haley corridor nor is NORA 
the only entity investing in the area.  Although NORA is not acting alone and is not investing in 
the OC Haley corridor as if it is an isolated entity, there is still a concern of future affordability 
given the trend of 
targeting to have on 
communities.   The 
additional investment 
is, in fact, geared 
towards housing and, in 
many cases, affordable 
housing.  In most cases, 
NORA is partnering 
with non- and for-profit 
entities to produce 
projects that incorporate affordable housing.  NORA has formed partnerships with the City of 
New Orleans, Gulf Coast Housing Partnership (GCHP), and Jericho Road Episcopal Housing 
Initiative (Jericho Road) (see Figure 10).89   
 NORA‘s partnerships are designed to curb gentrification and provide affordable housing 
options to residents.  However, these partnerships must also consider the need to produce profits 
for the partnering organizations.  In the case of Jericho Road, a non-profit faith-based community 
rehabilitation organization, NORA is providing funding to Jericho Road developers to be, in 
turn, improved and sold for homeownership to buyers that agree to reside in the property for at 
                                                          
89 Unisa Barrie.  Personal Interview.  June 16, 2010.  
Fig. 10: Map of Investments in Central City 
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least 5 years and have a family income equal or less than 30% of Area Median Income (AMI).  
Jericho Road has completed development on 55 affordable-housing properties in Central City 
and has begun another housing development to be completed in the next seven months.  This 
housing project, however, will only be one third affordable housing.  The remaining two thirds 
will be split equally between subsidized units and market rate units.90   
 NORA‘s largest partnership is with GCHP.  GCHP is a non-profit development 
organization that focuses on affordable housing.  GCHP funding is largely provided by Housing 
Partnership Network and Enterprise Community Partners and through partners on a project-
based level.91  These organizations have been major recipients of federal and state monies for 
redevelopment.  On the OC Haley Corridor, NORA has partnered with GCHP in the 
development of a restaurant, GCHP‘s and the Neighborhood Development Foundation (NDF) 
headquarters, several commercial units, and a mixed income/mixed use building including a 
residential component for senior citizens.92  
Outside of NORA, GCHP has pursued several residential ventures in Central City 
including the Venus Garden Apartments and the Muses Apartment Homes.  The Venus Garden 
Apartments include 30 loft-style apartments.  Although initially sold at market rate, in late 2009, 
the units that did not sell were made available at affordable rates to local and visiting artists.93  
The Muses Apartment Homes are nearing the end of the first phase of construction.  When 
completed, this mixed-use project will offer a variety of amenities to the tenants filling the 263 
                                                          
90 Unisa Barrie.  Personal Interview.  June 16, 2010.  
91 Gulf Coast Housing Partnership Homepage <http://www.gchp.net/about_us/> Accessed June 10, 2010.  
92 Gulf Coast Housing Partnership Venture Portfolio May 2010. 
<http://www.gchp.net/projects/gchp_presentation.pdf> Accessed June 10, 2010.  
93 Gulf Coast Housing Partnership Venture Portfolio May 2010. 
<http://www.gchp.net/projects/gchp_presentation.pdf.> Accessed June 10, 2010.  
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units, 35% of which will be affordable housing units made available to ―qualified working 
families and singles.‖94   
  NORA‘s independent efforts in residential areas are aimed at both reducing blight 
and providing affordable housing through the organization‘s Lot Next Door and Real Estate and 
Land-Banking Mechanism (REALM).  The Lot Next Door program allows residents to purchase 
a NORA-owned property that is located immediately adjacent to a currently owned property.95   
Data is not available as to the number of properties that have been sold under this program in 
Central City.  However, the program falls outside the issue of affordable housing as the 
properties are market rates and are available only to current home-owners, both requirements are 
uncharacteristic of individuals qualifying for affordable housing.  Under the REALM Program, 
NORA can ―expropriate clusters of blighted  
properties on its own in 
three neighborhoods 
that had been identified 
as having large 
numbers of blighted 
properties:  Central 
City, St. Roch, and the 
Lower 9th Ward then 
market the properties to 
                                                          
94 Gulf Coast Housing Partnership Venture Portfolio May 2010. 
<http://www.gchp.net/projects/gchp_presentation.pdf.> Accessed June 10, 2010.  
95 NORA. ―Let Next Door.‖  <http://www.noraworks.org/Lotnext.htm> Accessed June 10, 2010.  
Fig. 11: Map of selling clusters showing Recovery Target Areas 
Source: Green and Olshansky , 2009. 
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non-profit developers for low- and moderate-income housing.‖96   As of April of 2009, NORA 
had secured 75 properties in Central City under the REALM program with the number growing 
everyday as properties complete the expropriation process.97      
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS:  LIKELY OUTCOMES AND FORESEEABLE ISSUES 
 
NORA is attempting to generate a renaissance for Central City.  NORA‘s strategy is 
rooted in focusing investment to create additional investment from other sources, private and 
public.  NORA‘s unique authority and capacity to ―implement comprehensive neighborhood 
revitalization plans‖ put a myriad of pressures on the organization.98  These pressures are 
frequently at odds, as is the case between economic development and affordable housing as 
NORA‘s strategy indicates.  NORA‘s strategy is an attempt to balance these pressures:  to 
revitalize the neighborhood without neglecting affordability, to provide affordability without 
neglecting the need to provide economic development with an adequate tax base.99   
This balance is difficult to strike and there is preliminary evidence that affordability is 
already suffering.  Preliminary evidence of this includes the increased price of commercial 
property values has increased from $8-9 per square foot to $14-15 per square foot since 2007.100  
The  redevelopment of the C.J. Peete public housing project also illustrates this point as the 
number of affordable units has substantially decreased and the types of housing units have 
diversified from 723 units to 410 units (154 public housing; 133 tax credit/mixed income; 123 
market).101  This is also made evident, in part, by the need to decrease the affordable housing 
                                                          
96 Green, Timothy and Robert Olshansky.  ―Homeowner Decisions, Land Banking, and Land Use Change 
in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.‖  The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.  2009. Page 25.  
97 NORA Data.  Excel File.  
98 NORA Homepage. <http://www.noraworks.org/post_katrina.htm> Accessed June 2, 2010.  
99 Unisa Barrie.  Personal Interview.  June 16, 2010.  
100 Unisa Barrie.  Personal Interview.  July 6, 2010.  
101 Quigley, Bill. ―Save New Orleans Affordable Housing Fact Sheet.‖ United Peace Relief.  Dec. 23, 2007.   
 < http://www.unitedpeacerelief.org/Journal/files/448a34e7789c2209a17ef69f1dfd7c4c-54.html> 
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components of new residential developments as seen in the Venus Garden Apartments and 
Muses Apartment Homes. Although NORA is not responsible for the loss of affordable housing 
in Central City, however, given the need, NORA should respond with greater emphasis on the 
affordable housing component of its revitalization strategy.  One such effort, given NORA‘s 
unique authority and capacity, could be the formation of a community land trust.  
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CHAPTER 4:  ADDRESSING THE AFFORDABILITY ISSUE 
 
CURRENT OPTIONS 
 
Ideally, the housing market would respond to the needs of all consumers seeking housing.  
However, too often, the housing market seeks out the greatest profit and, in turn, focuses on 
producing housing that is the most lucrative—not affordable housing.  Thus the housing market 
requires intervention.  These interventions can be grouped into three distinct categories:  rental 
assistance programs, homeownership assistance programs, and land use and regulatory 
initiatives.  The categories vary in terms of the source from which the housing is provided (the 
public or private sphere) and the intended recipient of the incentive (the person in need of 
affordable housing or the person providing the affordable housing).   
 Rental assistance program take two basic forms:  supply-side rental programs and 
demand-side rental programs.  Supply-side rental programs focus on producing and maintaining 
housing units that are designated for occupancy by low and moderate-income households.  
Examples include the public housing program (housing projects built and owned by the 
government), LIHTC units, and grants and low-interest loans that encourage nonprofits and the 
private sector to build or rehabilitate affordable rental housing.102   Demand-side rental programs 
focus on directly aiding households in affording decent rental housing.  Examples include 
housing vouchers, short-term assistance to households threatened with eviction, and services that 
help low-income renters search for and find affordable housing in the private sector.  Targeted 
social services associated with providing housing to serve residents with special needs (e.g. 
                                                          
102  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Homepage.  ―Affordable Housing.‖  
<http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/> Accessed February 6, 2010.  
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homeless people, senior citizens, and people with disabilities) may also be included in demand-
side programs.103   
 Homeownership assistance programs can be oriented to both supply-side and demand-
side approaches.  These programs are aimed to expand access to homeownership.104  Specific 
programs include subsidizing the production, improvement, or rehabilitation of for-sale housing 
units as well as low-interest loans, counseling, and down payment assistance.  Federal 
government programs focus on demand-side initiatives in which homeownership is made more 
affordable, accessible, and attractive to potential home buyers.   
 Land use and regulatory initiatives, although quite different from rental and 
homeownership assistance programs, are potentially more effective at providing long-term 
affordability and impactful with regards to affecting the largest supplier of housing:  the private 
sector.  This is because land use and regulatory initiatives work to curb the behavior of the 
private market in terms of location, characteristics, and costs.105  Examples include the creative 
use of building codes, ―fair share‖ plans in which new, large residential development must 
include an affordable housing component, inclusionary zoning regulations, growth controls, 
smart growth policies, and land banking.106  The last of these, land banking, holds particular 
promise of improving the affordable housing stock in New Orleans.   
 New Orleans utilizes all categories of affordable housing tools, but not with the same 
regularity, frequency, or intensity as compared to each other. The Bureau of Government 
Research (BGR) has identified and defined the types of affordable housing programs available to 
                                                          
103 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Homepage.  ―Affordable Housing.‖  
<http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/> Accessed February 6, 2010.  
104 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Homepage.  ―Affordable Housing.‖  
<http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/> Accessed February 6, 2010.  
105U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Homepage.  ―Affordable Housing.‖  
<http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/> Accessed February 6, 2010.  
106 Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies:  Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖  Pages 6 and 7.  
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New Orleanians,107  The implementation of the programs described above in New Orleans has 
largely been left to the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO).  HANO was a large, deeply 
troubled housing authority with 8,421 public housing units (79 percent of which were in just nine 
very large projects) and 9,560 vouchers. According to U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development figures, 47 percent of HANO‘s public housing units were vacant in 2005 pre-
Katrina.  For more than 30 years, HUD had rated HANO as one of the country‘s worst-
performing housing authorities and the agency was under HUD receivership at the time of the 
hurricane.108   HANO had allowed decades of neglect and mismanagement to take their toll on 
New Orleans‘s public housing stock leaving them in severe distress.  The failure of HANO is in 
part due to the city historically citing public housing projects in low-income neighborhoods, 
isolating low-income residents from the rest of the city and exacerbating both racial and 
economic segregation creating pockets of African American, urban, poverty—not unlike what 
has played out in cities across the United States.   
 The current programs and incentives for providing affordable housing are not adequate in 
meeting current affordable housing needs.  The GNOCDC predicts, given a continuation of the 
current housing trends in New Orleans, that in 2012, there will be a surplus of market rate units 
of 4,156 and a 15,280 shortfall in affordable housing subsidies.109  Given the interconnectedness 
of the city‘s recovery, affordable housing, and residents returning home, alternatives must be 
aggressively explored and seriously considered.  One alternative method that has appeared in 
New Orleans‘s past and has proven effective in other cities is the creation of a land trust 
synonymous with a land bank.   
                                                          
107 Bureau of Governmental Research.  ―Cementing Imbalance:  A Post-Katrina Analysis of the Regional 
distribution of Subsidized Rental Housing.‖  August 2007.  Page 4.  
108 Popkin, Susan J., Margery A Turner, and Martha Burt.  ―Rebuilding Affordable Housing in New Orleans:  The 
Challenge of Creating Inclusive Communities.‖  After Katrina.  The Urban Institute.  January 2006.  Page 2.  
109 Plyer, Alison. et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖    Page 19.   
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 Affordable housing is a relationship between housing and people.  The goals surrounding 
affordable housing need to be aimed at maintaining a healthy, sustainable relationship between 
its components.  In keeping with this overarching concept and taking into consideration the 
economic climate, affordable housing should be oriented for long term affordability in desirable 
areas, require high-quality construction and design, meet local and regional demands, and be 
integrated with other development and housing.  Current affordable housing programs and 
policies address some of these concerns, but none are poised to address all of them.  There is no 
silver bullet to combat the lack of affordable housing or the growing need for affordable housing. 
However, land banking potentially can address a number of the goals affordable housing should 
be meeting and could be particularly effective in addressing the affordable housing problem in 
New Orleans.     
COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS:  ONE MITIGATING STRATEGY 
 The rising cost of housing is both a symptom and source of gentrification as it ―locally 
intensifies the growing [affordable housing] crisis in [the United States] and has become 
significantly worse in the past ten years.‖110  Although increased property values can be viewed 
as beneficial for a community, it is not always beneficial to the people that first resided within a 
gentrifying community as it can make the area unaffordable for this population.  Collective 
ownership is one response to gentrification as it addresses the underlying causes and greatest 
criticism of gentrification:  bringing control over the community to those who live within it 
through ownership.  There are several forms of collective ownership including Limited Equity 
Housing Cooperatives, Mutual Housing Associations, and the recommendation of this thesis to 
address the affordable housing issue in Central City, Community Land Trusts (CLTs).   
                                                          
110 DeFillippis, James.  Unmaking Goliath: Community control in the Face of Global Capital.  Page 88.   
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HUD defines a land trust or land bank as a governmental or nongovernmental nonprofit 
entity that focuses on the conversion of vacant, abandoned properties into productive uses.111  
Community land trusts expand upon this basic function to include a greater intended purpose of 
land trusts which embrace a focus other than that of maximizing profits, such as for providing a 
community with affordable housing.112  In the specific case of creating a land trust for the 
expressed purpose of creating affordable housing units, a group is formed, usually a nonprofit 
entity, that will provide the organizational structure to hold the land in trust and execute the land 
trust‘s purpose.  The group then acquires several parcels of land in a targeted geographic are the 
land or buildings erected in the future are sold to another party.  The building‘s buyer may be an 
individual homeowner, a cooperative housing corporation, a nonprofit organization or limited 
partnership developing rental housing, or any other nonprofit, governmental, or for-profit 
entity.113  The owner of any building on the land is given exclusive use of that land through the 
use of inheritable ground leases that typically extend for 99 years.114  The dual-ownership 
enables ―the landowner (the CLT) and a building‘s owner protect the latter‘s interests in security, 
privacy, legacy, and equity, while enforcing the CLT‘s interests in preserving the appropriate 
use, structural integrity, and continuing affordability of any buildings located upon its land.‖115 
 Affordability is maintained even if the owner of a building decides to sell his/her 
structure.   
 This is made possible through a formula included in the ground 
lease to calculate the value of the building. Designed to give 
present homeowners a fair return on their investment, while giving 
                                                          
111US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Homes and Communities, community Planning & 
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future homebuyers fair access to housing at an affordable price. By 
design and by intent, the CLT is committed to preserving the 
affordability of housing (and other structures) – one owner after 
another, one generation after another, in perpetuity.116 
 
Also, the CLT can reserve the right of first refusal should a leaseholder decide to sell 
their unit.117  In addition to securing affordability, the CLT also takes measures to secure the 
integrity of the physical and financial integrity of the structure.  The ground lease requires the 
owner to occupy the structure and maintain ―responsible use of the premises.‖ 118  The CLT 
maintains the right to step in and force improvements on any building that falls into disrepair.  
The CLT can also interfere should property owners default on their mortgages, forestalling 
foreclosure and maintaining the initial terms of the lease.119  The CLT provides the necessary 
safeguards to maintain affordability without compromising structural integrity, quality, or 
financing.  Although successful CLTs have clear and impactful benefits, creating a successful 
CLT is complicated and the process must tackle numerous obstacles.  
According to the National Community Land Trust Network, creating a land trust follows 
the general pattern of developing a rationale, identifying sponsorship, defining a service area, 
developing an organization to hold the land , deciding on a housing development strategy, and 
securing funding.  Each of these steps is described briefly in the table below and elaborated on 
with regards to the specific case of NORA and Central City in a later subsection.  
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 Step Definition
120
 
Rational Balance, as defined by the specific goals of the CLT, between the individual 
and community benefits created from the dual-ownership model. This 
balance can be aimed at a variety of goals. Examples of what balance may 
look like for specific CLTs include: Developing communities without 
displacing people; Retaining the public‘s investment in affordable housing; 
Perpetuating the affordability of privately owned housing 
Sponsorship  The entity that provides the impetus for a new CLT and plays the leading 
role in getting it organized. Sponsorship can come from grassroots activists, 
public officials, other nonprofit organizations, or private employers. 
Service Area CLTs are place-based organizations. They develop their projects and draw 
their members from a community that is geographically defined. This service 
area may be small or large, urban or rural. It may encompass a single 
neighborhood, several neighborhoods, an entire city, an entire county, or, in 
a few cases, a multi-county region. 
Organization 
and Education 
Building and educating the base that will support the CLT.  Key 
constituencies include:  (1) the community of individuals and institutions 
that call the CLT‘s service area their home; (2) nonprofit organizations 
serving the same population as the CLT; (3) governmental agencies to whom 
the CLT must look for project funding, regulatory approvals, and equitable 
taxation; (4) private lenders and donors on whom the CLT must depend for 
mortgage financing and operating support; and (5) housing professionals on 
whom the CLT must depend for legal advice, accurate appraisals and 
development expertise.  Three strategies of where to start organizing and 
educating these groups include Community organizing, Core Group 
organizing, and Resource organizing.  
Development The strategy implemented to bring land and housing into their price-
restricted domain of permanent affordability.  Several strategies exist 
including: CLT-initiated development, Buyer-initiated acquisition, 
Developer-initiated projects, Stewardship programs with partners doing all 
development, Municipally-initiated projects, municipally-mandated units 
(inclusionary housing), and PHA-divested housing.  
Funding  CLTs need funding for project and operational costs.  Successful CLTs take 
at least three years to become financially sustainable.  Project funds are 
needed for: land acquisition, pre-development feasibility, architectural 
design, site preparation, infrastructure development, construction of 
residential (or commercial) structures, rehabilitation of residential (or 
commercial) structures, down-payment assistance for first-time homebuyers, 
and permanent financing for first-time homebuyers or for the nonprofit (or 
for-profit) buyers of residential or commercial structures on leased land. 
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Fig. 12: Table of Steps to Form a CLT 
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CASE STUDIES: BURLINGTON, VERMONT and ESCAMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA 
Although the benefits of successful CLTs are numerous and well-aligned to the mission 
of NORA and needs of Central City, CLTs can have mixed success.  The Burlington Community 
Land Trust (BCLT) illustrates the positive impact communal ownership can have on rising 
property values while the Escambia County Community Land Trust (ECCLT) illustrates the 
inability for a land trust to navigate the obstacles that arise in organizing, funding, and operating 
a CLT.   
 The BCLT is perhaps the most well-known and successful land trust in the United States.  
In the 1980s, the cost of renting and owning housing was growing about twice as fast as average 
incomes in Burlington, Vermont.  This rapid growth coupled with a city government brought into 
power by affordable-housing advocates provided the context for the creation of the BCLT.  In 
1984, focused on preserving affordable housing in Burlington‘s rapidly gentrifying North End 
District and community development, the BCLT was incorporated.  The newly incorporated land 
trust received funding through the city government and through CDBG funds as well as through 
some creative funding sources such as the Burlington Employees Retirement System.121   The 
BCLT embraced the standard governing organization represented by one-third leaseholders, one-
third representatives from community organizations, and one-third at-large community members.  
The board is elected by the membership which includes all leaseholders and anyone from the at-
large community that pays the $1 membership fee.122   
The BCLT is meeting its goals of developing an area and maintaining affordability.  As 
of 2004, the BCLT had about 500 units of housing on its land, half being owner-occupied and 
half rental or mutual housing.  In addition, the BLCT had grown the uses of its land to include 
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community centers, family emergency centers, special needs housing, and single-room-
occupancy (SRO) housing for single people with very low incomes—providing not just housing, 
but job opportunities and goods and services to support this community.123   Although the BCLT 
continues to grow in size and scope, it has maintained affordability for Burlington‘s low-income 
residents.  Since its beginnings in 1984 through 2002, the BCLT has added 247 units with 97 
units changing owners through resale (see Figure 12) and affordability has only increased (the 
average BCLT was affordable to a household earning 62% AMI and on resale was affordable to 
a household earning 57% AMI).124   
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 The BCLT is only one of 243 operating land trusts in the United States, but not all of 
these land trusts experience the same success as what has been seen in Burlington.125  The case 
of the land trust in Escambia County, Florida illustrates the obstacles that land trusts must 
overcome and, in the case of the ECCLT, are not able to.  High operation costs and unbalanced 
or unorganized internal structure are issues all land trusts must navigate.  However, these issues 
can become overwhelming and land trusts can fail to address them and, in turn, fail themselves 
especially when corruption influences how these issues are addressed.  In 2003, the ECLT was 
formed as a non-profit organization aimed at providing affordable housing through 
entrepreneurship-centered economic development.  The ECLT was formed in response to a 
series of studies completed in 2000 that identified five neighborhoods in the city of Pensacola, 
Florida as having a ―dire need for affordable housing and jobs.‖126   
The first of the ECCLT‘s problems was the structure of the non-profit organization.  John 
Wyche formed the ECCLT with local entrepreneurs, Marvin Ginns and Oliver Darden.  Wyche 
served as the head of the organization, overseeing a board varying from five to nine members 
mostly chosen by Wyche.127  In addition, the financial activities of the trust were not made 
readily available to the public or to the governing board.  This structure enabled corruption as the 
issue of maintaining the affordability of the land trust intensified.  The ECCLT‘s affordable 
housing initiative had three components:  purchasing a 144 low-income apartment complex, 
constructing 35 to 50 single-family homes, and creating a charter school from a local public 
school.128  The apartment complex quickly became too expensive to operate (more than $10,000 
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per month) and monies designated for the charter school began to be diverted into the affordable 
housing projects and, eventually, into projects outside of the land trust—at the direction of 
Wyche.  After an internal School District audit in 2008, the ECCLT quickly began to dissolve 
and today, exists only in name.  Although deceit and greed catalyzed the ECCLT‘s failures, 
underlying these problems was the inability to overcome problems common to operating a CLT.  
With proper oversight, clear internal operating guidelines, realistic vision, and appropriate 
funding, CLTs can be successful and should be employed in creating a CLT in Central City.  
ST. TAMMANY PARISH: LOUISIANA’S FIRST CLT 
 On November 6, 2008, the St. Tammany Parish Council approved an ordinance that set 
the framework for the creation of a CLT.  The ordinance grants the Office of the Parish President 
to enter into agreements with local and state agencies that have title to residential properties as 
well as with non-profit agencies for the expressed purpose of creating a CLT that is aligned with 
the Parish‘s guiding development plan, the Redevelopment and Disposition Plan.129  Through 
this authority, St. Tammany Parish identified an existing non-profit agency, the Northshore 
Housing Initiative (NHI), to be a CLT.  This is the first land trust to be created in the state of 
Louisiana and is being used as a tool to help address the growing gap between increased housing 
prices and incomes by providing affordable housing. 
    St. Tammany‘s CLT is newly created and has not begun providing the community with 
affordable housing.  Although the CLT is very new, being a first for Louisiana, it provides an 
opportunity for understanding this relatively obscure affordable housing mechanism.  Once St. 
Tammany provided the legal framework within the parish to allow for a CLT the first challenge 
included forming or finding an organization to serve as the CLT.  NHI was an established non-
profit with a mission aimed at providing affordable housing.  For these two reasons, with a few 
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changes to NHI‘s by-laws including a board of directors shaped in the classic CLT model, the 
organization was designated the CLT.  The next task was to secure funding.  So far, funding has 
not been an issue as NHI already has an operating budget and St. Tammany has committed 
$50,000 for the next three years, however, operating costs for the land trust are nothing as NHI 
does not yet operate any affordable housing units.130   The lack of land, however, is a major 
obstacle facing NHI.  
 Originally, NHI was to have land donated to it by the Louisiana Land Trust (LLT).  The 
lots the LLT decided to donate were largely in the eastern area of St. Tammany Parish—an area 
in danger of severe flooding.   In response, a deal was struck between the Parish, the NHI, and 
the LLT for there to be a public auction of all the lots held by the LLT and that NHI have funds 
available to purchase land for its first development.131   The auction is scheduled for July 17th.  
NHI is looking to purchase lots located largely in Mandeville due to its second obstacle:  concern 
that St. Tammany Parish will not embrace the land trust form of ownership.132   Mandeville has 
been selected because it has some of the highest land costs in St. Tammany Parish and a working 
class population that is finding it increasingly difficult to achieve homeownership.  The current 
site NHI hopes to attain will accommodate 20-24 units of affordable housing.  NHI does not 
intend to stay solely in Mandeville, however.   
 St. Tammany‘s CLT is designed to grow.  The CLT is set up to operate in a five parish 
area and NHI is already planning on expanding to Tangipahoa Parish in 2011.133  NHI is also 
interested in being involved with a CLT in New Orleans.  NHI has not articulated the ways in 
which it would be involved but is motivated to be involved because of its view that there needs 
                                                          
130 Clary, Maureen.  Email Correspondence.  July 7, 2010.  
131 Clary, Maureen.  Email Correspondence.  July 7, 2010. 
132 Clary, Maureen.  Email Correspondence.  July 7, 2010. 
133 Clary, Maureen.  Email Correspondence.  July 7, 2010. 
51 
to be regional or statewide standards and best practices for all CLTs or there will be renegade 
organizations that will impact the reputation and viability of all CLTs.134  NHI has made it clear, 
however, that CLTs provide long-term affordability, that it will need community support to have 
long-term success, and that it needs financial and regulatory assistance from the government to 
begin achieving its affordable housing goals.   These lessons are important for a viable CLT to be 
created in Central City.  
CURRENT EFFORTS:  CENTRAL CITY and the LOWER 9
th
 WARD 
NORA is familiar with the CLT model and is currently in the process of formulating two 
pilot land trusts in New Orleans.  The first of these projects is a commercial land trust along the 
OC Haley corridor and the other is a housing land trust located in the Lower 9th Ward.135      The 
two pilot CLTs are being implemented to explore their viability and reproducibility in New 
Orleans.136   The commercial land trust in Central City would not only be the first commercial 
land trust in New Orleans, but the first commercial land trust formed in the country.  Although 
the Central City CLT is for commercial purposes, many of the same issues and questions that 
face residential CLTs are arising.   A webinar with the National CLT Network identified these 
issues:  subsidy resources, competition, strategic partnerships, organization structure, staffing 
responsibilities, operating revenue, and sustainability.137  The CLT continues to make progress 
and some strategic decisions have been made with regards to the commercial focus on ―Main 
                                                          
134 Clary, Maureen.  Email Correspondence.  July 7, 2010. 
135 Brown, Michael.  Personal Interview.  July 15, 2010. 
136 Brown, Michael.  Personal Interview.  July 15, 2010.  
137 National Community Land Trust Network.  Webinar.  April 16, 2010. 
<http://www.cltnetwork.org/doc_library/p313-Commercial%20Webinar%20Presentation%20v7.pdf> Accessed 
June 11, 2010.  
52 
Street‖ locations, dedicated to preserving commercial properties, utilizing commercial ground 
leasing, and emphasizing businesses stewardship.138  
 In a presentation by NORA at a Board of Commissioners meeting other decisions were 
shared with regards to the commercial CLT:  funding was announced to come in part by 
recipients of OC Haley corridor revitalization monies in the form of dues to the forming CLT, 
the CLT would be set-up to ―reinvest into projects such as acquisition, streetscape, and façade 
improvements along the boulevard,‖ and that NORA and other City and community leaders 
would appoint an independent seven-member Board of Directors.139  In addition to these 
decisions, an organization operating as the CLT, the Crescent City Land Trust, Inc., could be 
created as soon as by the end of July 2010.140  Decisions still need to be made about the 
population targeted by the CLT and the specific dispersal of benefits between initial participants 
and long-term program goals.141  
The other pilot CLT is taking place in the Lower 9th Ward.  With some changes to the 
organizations bylaws, the Neighborhood Empowerment Network Association (NENA) is taking 
on the role of the CLT.  Housing is relatively already affordable in this area, so the CLT is taking 
on a different function: ensuring continued neighborhood control.  The CLT is working to curb 
speculation, to prevent against absentee tenants and/or landlords, and limit the displacement of 
the neighborhood‘s current residents.142  Like the commercial CLT, NENA is still working out 
the specifics of how the land trust will balance community and individual benefits.  While these 
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details are worked out, NENA has begun to acquire properties through NORA and is looking to 
develop several housing units.  
These two pilot projects are just one component of a larger process of bringing the CLT 
model to New Orleans.  Several municipal agencies, philanthropic agencies, and planning efforts 
have expressed an interest in the general concept of CLTs in New Orleans, including the Ford 
Foundation, NORA, the CCRA, the Master Plan, and various other community organizations and 
municipal agencies.  The pilot projects are part of the business planning phase of bringing CLTs 
to New Orleans which also includes another component focused on growing the CLT model in 
New Orleans.  Participants in the business planning phase are exploring growing both residential 
and commercial CLTs through grassroots efforts, the public sector, and non-profits.143 The desire 
to grow CLTs is an opportunity that could prove the appropriate impetus, in addition to the 
existing need for affordable housing in Central City, for NORA to establish a residential CLT in 
this neighborhood.  
COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS, NORA, AND CENTRAL CITY 
 Forming a CLT would address many of the shortcomings that face NORA‘s current 
strategy.  NORA‘s approach potentially creates disparity between the improvement of Central 
City and the improvement of the people that live in Central City.  The CLT would address this 
disconnect in that it creates real benefits from both individuals and the community by preserving 
affordability, retaining community wealth, and enhancing residential stability while also 
expanding individual homeownership, creating individual wealth, and enabling residential 
mobility.144  A CLT would also maintain long-term and diverse affordability.   
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Currently NORA only has restrictions for first time homeowners—these restrictions do 
not extend to resale transactions.  Although first-time homeowners must meet an affordability 
criteria based upon a percentage of AMI and agree to occupy the home for at least five years, 
there is no restriction on the individual(s) who would potentially purchase this home from the 
original homebuyer(s) nor are there any restrictions on what the original homeowner(s) can sell 
their property for.145  In addition, the current restriction on first-time homebuyers dictates that 
they make 30% of AMI.146  Although this extends affordability to households with very low 
incomes, a CLT provides a greater range of affordability by requiring potential homeowners to 
have a greater range of incomes, albeit still below a set percentage of AMI.147    
 Furthermore, the formation of a CLT is in keeping with the city of New Orleans‘ Master 
plan.  The Master Plan encourages the creation of community based ownership for the purpose of 
promoting affordable housing and green space and identifies NORA along with the City 
Planning Commission and other unspecified neighborhood groups to lead this initiative.148  
There is no lack of rationale for creating a CLT in Central City.  There are, however, decisions to 
be made with regards to specifics of the CLT as well as obstacles to overcome in following 
through with those decisions.  Following the framework set forth by the Community Land Trust 
Network, decisions need to be made with regards to rational, sponsorship, service area, education 
and organizing, development and funding.  It is not the recommendation that NORA be the sole 
party responsible for creating, implementing, and operating a CLT, but that NORA is one partner 
supporting these actions by incorporating a CLT into its strategy for revitalizing Central City. 
The table below summarizes the CLT envisioned for Central City. 
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 Step Application in Central City  
Rational Developing communities without displacing people.  
Sponsorship  NORA would work closely with an identified existing non-profit that would 
eventually take on the operations of the CLT such as the Central City 
Housing Development Corporation.   
Service Area Focus initially on Central City, however, leave room for growth or for 
partnering with other non-profits in other neighborhoods.  The issue of 
affordable housing is not unique to Central City and the implementation of a 
CLT may prove to be a model worth replicating.  In addition, NORA has 
similarly vested interests in neighborhoods throughout New Orleans as it 
does in Central City.   
Organization 
and Education 
Core Group organizing will expedite the formation of a CLT, increase the 
CLT‘s credibility, and borrowing capacity.  NORA, neighborhood 
organizations including the CCRA and OC Haley Merchants Association, 
consultants from Burlington Associates, non-profit developers (GCHP), city 
planning department official, and city council representatives would 
comprise the core group.   
Development The CLT would likely adopt the municipally-initiated project strategy 
developing parcels made available to it through NORA.  The CLT could also 
allow for some of the parcels to be developed as market-rate units if desired.    
Funding  Funding could come from untapped state and federal resources.  Initial costs 
may be minimized if NORA donated properties and using an existing non-
profit.   
  
The rational for a CLT in Central City has been echoed throughout this thesis.  Given 
NORA‘s existing mission and on-going strategy in Central City, the rationale of a CLT initiated 
by NORA would target a diverse population with regards to income and would emphasize the 
need to revitalize the area, not just develop affordable housing. In short, NORA would be 
seeking balance between developing Central City and retaining current residents by providing 
adequate and long-term affordable housing options.   
The neighborhood size CLT would be most appropriate for NORA‘s goals as it would 
complement the current targeting strategy already occurring in the Central City neighborhood.  
However, NORA should consider expanding from Central City as it has properties all over New 
Orleans and affordable housing is a city-wide issue particularly if there are existing CLTs 
Fig. 14: Table of Steps to Form a CLT in Central City  
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seeking to work within New Orleans, such as NHI. Traditionally, CLTs have focused on one 
neighborhood.  These CLTs make up 25% of all CLTs in operation today.149  CLTs can focus on 
geographic areas that extend to an entire metropolitan area or even to a region (as large as one or 
several counties).  Larger geographic areas are most appropriate for more rural place, but for 
urban settings there are many advantages for a CLT to focus its mission on a single or a few 
neighborhoods.  Benefits of this smaller focus include a lower cost of operation, a commitment 
to neighborhood revitalization, and increased landlord presence, among others.150   
Although NORA could potentially serve as the CLT, government agencies infrequently 
take on this role.  Non-profit organizations make up most CLTs because the agency is able to 
focus on a charitable purpose and has access to a wide range of funding sources, among other 
advantages.  In light of this, NORA‘s   role in the formation of the CLT will be both significant 
and unique, but not serving as the CLT.  NORA‘s obligation to both eradicate blight and return 
properties back to the city‘s payrolls makes a CLT a natural option for the organization to 
pursue.  NORA has control over thousands of blighted properties it needs to have put back into 
commerce.  The CLT is in need of property and would put these properties back into commerce.  
A reciprocating relationship between the CLT and NORA could include NORA selling or 
donating properties it controls in Central City to the CLT. Many CLTs do not have properties 
that sit adjacent to each other, rather the properties are located randomly in a defined geographic 
area, such as the size of Central City.  Thus, NORA would have flexibility in deciding which 
properties the agency would like to give to the CLT to make it the most viable and which 
properties it would like to keep for future redevelopment plans.   The creation of a residential 
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CLT is not just a great opportunity for Central City, it is a great opportunity for NORA.  To 
further ensure that NORA also benefited in its relationship with the CLT, NORA would sit on 
the board of the CLT and would have oversight in seeing that properties were rehabilitated and 
put back into commerce.   
Development is a significant obstacle for creating a successful CLT in Central City.  
Ideally, NORA would donate properties it holds title to in Central City to the CLT.  The CLT 
would, in turn, develop the property or seek out another non-profit developer, such as GCHP 
with experience in the area, who would rehabilitate the property or even build something new at 
which point the CLT would ensure the long-term affordability of the parcel.  The issue of 
internal conflict arises when considering that the properties controlled by NORA in Central City, 
should property values continue to increase, could become very valuable pieces of property that 
could be sold at market-rates.  Choosing to make available its resources to the CLT, namely with 
regards to providing the CLT with parcels of land in Central City, could prove to be in direct 
conflict with NORA‘s future interests with these properties.  The types, condition, and price of 
properties NORA would potentially donate or sell to the CLT would need careful consideration.   
Funding remains a formidable challenge in formulating successful CLTs.  Money is not 
only needed to acquire land and properties, it is also needed to repair and maintain properties, a 
particularly expensive task given the widespread blight in Central City.  In addition, CLTs 
generally take at least three years to become financially sustainable and often CLTs require 
continued outside funding depending on its affordability goals.151   However, even if NORA or 
the designated non-profit cannot financially contribute to the CLT, funding sources do exist that 
could potentially sustain the CLT.  
                                                          
151 Davis, John Emmeus.  ―Starting a Community Land Trust: Organizational and Operational Choices.‖  CLT 
Network.  <http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=106> Accessed July 2, 
2010.  
58 
In response to the impact of mortgage foreclosures and declining property values in much 
of the country, Congress has appropriated $3.92 billion under the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008 in US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) monies.152  HUD has developed the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) and the procedures for allocating monies to the 
states and communities with the main focus of this program to return abandoned or foreclosed 
homes back into commerce.  HUD has allocated $34,183,994 in grant funds to the State of 
Louisiana and the Louisiana Office of Community Development (OCD) will receive the 
allocated grand funds.153  The OCD has designated the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency 
(LFHA) as the lead agency in distributing and monitoring the expenditures of these funds 
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according to the guidelines outlined by HERA.  Pre-applications have been received, and 
Request for Proposals have been submitted and 23 grantees determined in April 2009.154   
Given the intent of the NSP and the limited resources for this program, it has been 
determined it is in the best interest to designate a small area of concentrated need as the area of 
greatest need—a targeting strategy.  The Central City neighborhood is one of four areas that have 
been targeted to receive a portion of NSP monies (see Figure 15).  Funding is to be spent on 
eleven projects listed below, including a program specifically focused on creating land banks 
(see Figure 16).    Orleans Parish has been designated $2,302,208 for implementing appropriate 
NSP programs and has awarded the money to four entities (see Figure 17).155   
Finding funding to initiate a land bank is a serious impediment.  However, $467,074 of 
the Orleans Parish NSP monies has not been spent and, as of September 30, 2009, none of the 
$2,000,000 in state funding earmarked for Land Banking Assistance has been spent.156  This 
money may provide some of the funding needed to form a land bank in Central City.  Although it 
is not known how much money would be required to begin a land trust, some of the costs of 
pursuing this affordable housing in Central City may be frayed due to NORA‘s current 
ownership of at least 75 properties in Central City.  Thus, money would not be needed for 
property acquisition, but for maintenance and property improvements and subsidizing the cost of 
the homes to make them affordable to lower-income residents.   
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Project # Project Title 
301 Rental Housing Development 
400 Land Banking Assistance 
BCKT Bucket Project 
200 Homeownership Development 
500 Homebuyer Counseling 
201 Homehowernship—120% AMI or Below 
101  LHFA‘s Administration 
100 OCD Administration 
300 Rental—25% Set Aside 50% AMI or Below 
9999 Restricted Balance 
600 Homebuyer Bond Program  
Grantee Amount Awarded 
Gulf Coast Housing Partnership 
RD‐15  
$500,000 
Enterprise Corporation HD‐13  $1,078,000 
New Orleans Neighborhood 
Development Collaborative  
HD‐21  
$217,134 
Neighborhood Housing Service 
HB‐02  
$40,000 
Fig. 17: Table of LHFA Awardees and Award Amounts 
Fig. 16: Table of NSP Funded Projects 
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Source: State of Louisiana Division of Administration. Jul 1, 2009 
thru Sep 30, 2009 Performance Report. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
CONCLUSIONS 
 NORA‘s strategy and the more general trend of neighborhood revitalization rely on the 
infusion of investment into a defined and relatively contained geographical area to, in turn, spur 
additional investment from the private market and other sources.  This strategy makes sensible 
use of limited resources, but is not without its weaknesses and negative effects.  However, there 
are methods of addressing these weaknesses and negative effects especially if the impacts can be 
anticipated and planning is proactive.  In the case of NORA and the OC Haley corridor and 
Central City neighborhood, the neighborhood is attracting addition investment  and will continue 
to do so.  However, there are few safeguards in place to counteract the negative effects of 
gentrification and protect the general affordability of the area.  For this reason, the NORA 
strategy does not need to be overhauled or severely changed, but should incorporate an 
additional component in the form of aiding in the creation and operation of an affordable housing 
Community Land Trust in Central City.   
 Affordable housing and economic development are sorely needed in Central City.  Prior 
to Hurricane Katrina the community and planners had expressed a need to address these issues in 
Central City.  This has not changed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and, in many ways, the 
need has intensified particularly with regards to affordable housing.  Affordability has decreased 
since the 2005 storm, city-wide as well as nation-wide.  New Orleanians pay greater percentages 
of their incomes for decent housing and resident incomes in Central City are approximately half 
that of the average income in New Orleans, making Central City residents even more vulnerable 
to the affordable housing crisis.  In addition, the area has also suffered from the absence of 
economic activity on its once prosperous commercial corridor, OC Haley Boulevard.   The 
progression of planning efforts, however, in response to Hurricane Katrina has tended towards 
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prioritizing the economic revitalization of the city over that of housing recovery—particularly 
that of low-income housing.  Regardless of whether this focus is ethical or moral, it is 
economical and, although that fact may be unfortunate, it is the reality with which New Orleans 
must recover.  NORA, a city agency, has adopted the recovery priorities and has developed a 
complimentary strategy shaped by its limitations and executed through its unique authorities.   
 NORAs seeming focus on economic development does not need to exclude the 
simultaneous development of affordable housing.  NORA can effectively accomplish its 
economic revitalization of Central City while also ensuring greater affordability for residents 
through initiating the creation of a CLT.  The goals of a land trust accomplishes many of the 
goals NORA is working towards in Central City including blight remediation, providing long-
term affordable housing options, and returning properties to commerce.  Although there is much 
work to do to make a CLT in Central City a reality, many of the obstacles that hinder CLT 
success are perhaps not so threatening in this particular case.  Funding sources appear available 
and several properties are already owned.  In addition, the area is becoming increasingly 
attractive to outside interests and current residents have little control over their community—
these are some of the conditions that make CLTs an appropriate and successful option for 
providing affordable housing.   
   A CLT is a long-term investment in Central City and its residents.  A CLT will require 
continued oversight and continued investment, but can also create continued affordability, 
continued empowerment of residents, and continued economic growth.  Should the investments 
NORA is making and seeking have the intended effects on OC Haley and Central City, property 
values will rise and the area will become more expensive.  The secondary effects of this will 
provide added support of local businesses and community facilities, it may help to improve the 
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local schools, and may even aid in the decrease of crime.  However it will also likely lead to the 
pushing out of current residents—residents that have endured the disinvestment in their 
community and should now benefit from its revitalization.  A CLT can help ensure that the 
brighter future of Central City is something that is not determined by income bracket, but by the 
desire to take part in the revitalization of this unique and important New Orleans neighborhood.   
  
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
As mentioned before, the actual outcomes of NORA‘s strategy are largely unknown as 
the strategy is in the early stages of implementation.  This does not mean that likely outcomes 
cannot be predicted or that NORA should not consider additional strategies for troubleshooting 
likely negative effects or problems with its current course of action.  However, there is room for 
future research.  Future research should continue as the strategy progresses, once it has been 
completed, and in the years following its completion.  Specifically, research examining the 
demographic composition of the neighborhood and the overall affordability of the area would be 
appropriate and very telling as to the impacts NORA‘s targeting strategy and any other strategy 
implemented in the future as related to Central City.  Following Galster‘s, etal. approach, the 
adjusted interrupted time series model, on their study of Richmond, Virginia would be one way 
to measure the consequences of targeting as this model ―compare[s] differences in levels and 
trends of an outcome indicator between target and control neighborhoods before and after the 
intervention, while controlling for coincident citywide changes in trends.‖157  This is a current 
limitation of this thesis as the redevelopment of Central City is in the very early stages of 
implementation.  Other valuable research would include evaluating community sentiments and 
perceptions of NORA‘s actions.  It is unclear how the community views what NORA is doing in 
                                                          
157 Galster, George et al.  ―Targeting Investments for Neighborhood Revitalization.‖  Page 458.  
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their neighborhood or how NORA is doing this in neighborhood.  An understanding of 
community opinion may clarify the effects of NORA‘s strategy as there are a variety of reasons 
people may leave an area—not just that they are pushed out by increased property values.  
Although further research is needed, whether rooted in quantifiable measures or qualitative 
discussions will provide greater clarity as to the future direction of Central City, there are already 
some important implications taking shape.     
New Orleans, since Hurricane Katrina, has become, as a whole, wealthier, younger, and 
whiter.158  This trend diverges greatly from what Central City has historically been and what it 
has become since Hurricane Katrina.  Demographic changes in themselves are not necessarily 
good or bad, however, they can be an indicator of a greater movement, of larger forces at work, 
and can have very negative implications for certain populations.  Given the history of Central 
City, the state of affordable housing, the current demographic trend of New Orleans, there is 
reason for concern that Central City will experience a demographic change as an effect not of 
personal choice, but of economic coercion.  Regardless of race, socioeconomic class, household 
composition, or education level, residents of Central City and residents of New Orleans, should 
have the ability to remain in their communities, especially if their communities are being 
improved by federal monies.  Furthermore, as a public entity, charged with encouraging both 
economic development and affordable housing, NORA has the obligation to actively protect the 
interests of Central City residents on both fronts.  To allow NORA‘s current strategy which 
embraces only one of its obligations would allow the organization to be remiss in its public 
duties and set a standard that communicates the importance of economic development over 
access to improved areas.   
 
                                                          
158 Plyer, Alison and Elaine Ortiz. ―Who lives in New Orleans and the Metro Area now?‖  Page 6.  
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Level of schooling (2000)  Central City 
Orleans 
Parish Louisiana 
United 
States 
Total population 18 years and 
over   13,396 355,507 3,250,523 209,279,149 
  Less than 9th grade 12.5% 7.2% 8.4% 7.1% 
  9th to 12th grade, no diploma 31.4% 18.2% 17.2% 13.2% 
  High school diploma or GED   26.2% 24.0% 32.0% 28.6% 
  
Some college or Associate 
degree 18.3% 27.5% 25.6% 28.8% 
  
Bachelor's degree to higher 11.6% 23.1% 16.8% 22.3% 
 
     
 
 
     
 
     
Average household income 
(2000)  Central City 
 Orleans 
Parish Louisiana 
United 
States 
Average household income $23,237 $43,176 $44,833 $56,644 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A:Table of comparing level of schooling between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and the US 
Appendix B:Table of comparing average household income between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and 
the US 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 Full-
Count Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. 
<http://www.gnocdc.org> 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 Full-
Count Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. 
<http://www.gnocdc.org> 
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Population in poverty (2000) 
 Central 
City 
 Orleans 
Parish Louisiana 
United 
States 
Total population for whom poverty 
status is determined   18,993   468,453   4,334,094   273,882,232 
  People living in poverty 49.8% 27.9% 19.6% 12.4% 
  People living at or above poverty 50.2% 72.1% 80.4% 87.6% 
Total population 0-5 for whom 
poverty status is determined 1,677  39,308  375,393  22,636,650  
  Children 0-5 living in poverty 75.2% 43.0% 29.0% 18.1% 
  
Children 0-5 living at or above 
poverty 24.8% 57.0% 71.0% 81.9% 
Total population 6-11 for whom 
poverty status is determined 2,046 44,048 403,616 24,587,815 
  Children 6-11 living in poverty 67.5% 42.4% 26.8% 16.9% 
  
Children 6-11 living at or above 
poverty 32.5% 57.6% 73.2% 83.1% 
Total population 12-17 for whom 
poverty status is determined 1,876 44,210 421,352 23,700,796 
  Children 12-17 living in poverty 54.7% 36.5% 24.4% 14.8% 
  
Children 12-17 living at or above 
poverty 45.3% 63.5% 75.6% 85.2% 
Total population 18-64 for whom 
poverty status is determined 11,022 286,783 2,644,159 169,610,423 
  Adults 18-64 living in poverty 44.0% 24.0% 17.0% 11.1% 
  
Adults 18-64 living at or above 
poverty 56.0% 76.0% 83.0% 88.9% 
Total population 65 and older for 
whom poverty status is determined 2,372 54,104 489,574 33,346,548 
  
Adults 65 and older living in 
poverty (%) 39.4% 19.3% 16.7% 9.9% 
  
Adults 65 and older living at or 
above poverty (%) 60.6% 80.7% 83.3% 90.1% 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C: comparing pop. in poverty between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and the US 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 Full-
Count Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. 
<http://www.gnocdc.org> 
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 Racial & ethnic diversity (2000)  Central City 
 Orleans 
Parish Louisiana 
United 
States 
Black or African American 87.1%  66.6%  32.3%  12.1%  
White 9.9% 26.6% 62.6% 69.2% 
Asian 0.6% 2.3% 1.2% 3.6% 
American Indian 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 
Other 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 
2 race categories 0.7% 1.0% 0.9% 1.6% 
Hispanic (any race) 1.6% 3.1% 2.4% 12.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Households by type (2000) 
 Central 
City 
 Orleans 
Parish Louisiana 
United 
States 
Total households 8,147 188,251 1,656,053 105,480,101 
Female householder (no husband 
present) with children under 18 24.0% 17.7% 11.9% 8.4% 
Male householder (no wife present) 
with children under 18 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.4% 
Married-couple family, with 
children under 18 5.5% 14.8% 24.3% 24.9% 
Nonfamily households, with 
children under 18 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 
Households with no people under 18 
years 67.5% 64.7% 60.8% 63.9% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 Full-
Count Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. 
<http://www.gnocdc.org> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D:Table of comparing racial & ethnic diversity between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and the 
US 
Appendix E:Table of comparing household type between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and the US 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 Full-
Count Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. 
<http://www.gnocdc.org> 
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Neighborhood 
June 
2005 June 2008 
% Recovery 
June 2008 June 2009 
% Recovery 
June 2009 
Algiers Point 1,322 1,351 102% 1,417 107% 
Audubon 7,576 7,344 97% 7,292 96% 
B.W. Cooper 1,269 357 28% 345 27% 
Bayou St. John 2,292 1,921 84% 1,976 86% 
Behrman 3,878 3,697 95% 3,832 99% 
Black Pearl 1,115 1,107 99% 1,082 97% 
Broadmoor 3,139 2,551 81% 2,324 74% 
Bywater 2,570 2,091 81% 2,165 84% 
Central Business District 1,316 1,585 120% 1,939 147% 
Central City 8,175 6,405 78% 6,233 76% 
City Park 1,670 1,534 92% 1,585 95% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F: Households Actively Receiving Mail by Neighborhood in New Orleans (Algiers Point 
through City Park) 
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 Affordable Housing 
Strategy 
Affordable Housing Strategy Description 
Public Housing Units Rental apartments supported by federal public housing operating 
subsidies. To be eligible, tenants must have incomes at or below 
80% of area median income. Many have very low incomes; Tenant-
based vouchers 
Tenant-Based Vouchers  Federal rental subsidies, administered by a public housing authority, 
for units that tenants choose in the private market. This category 
includes the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher and post-Katrina 
DHAP voucher programs. To be eligible, households must have 
incomes at or below 80% of area median income. However, federal 
law gives priority to households with incomes at or below 30% of 
area median income; HUD project-based rental assistance – HUD 
agreements with owners of multifamily apartment complexes to pay 
the difference between the approved rent and what the tenant can 
afford. To be eligible, tenants must have incomes at or below 80% of 
area median income. Nationwide, two-thirds of the households in 
these units are elderly and disabled.  Many have very low incomes. 
Low Income Housing 
Tax Credits (LITHC) 
Federal income tax credits administered by the Internal Revenue 
Service and awarded to developers by the Louisiana Housing 
Finance Agency. Developers typically sell the credits to raise equity 
capital for their projects. The tax credits may be claimed annually 
for 10 years against eligible development costs for units restricted to 
low-income households. The units are generally affordable to 
households with incomes between 45% and 60% of area median 
income. Federal tax law requires the owner to comply with rent and 
income restrictions on designated units for 30 years after they are 
made available for occupancy. GO Zone Housing Tax Credits are a 
form of low income housing tax credits. 
Small Rental Property 
Program 
A rental housing initiative, formulated by the Louisiana Recovery 
Authority and the state Office of Community Development, that uses 
CDBG funds to provide forgivable loans to landlords for the repair 
of hurricane-damaged small rental properties, primarily those with 
one to four units. In return for financing, landlords must comply for 
5 to 10 years (longer for nonprofits) with certain tenant income and 
rent restrictions. Depending on the level of CDBG assistance, the 
landlord sets maximum rents per restricted unit at levels affordable 
to households earning 50%, 65% or 80% of area median income 
Subsidized Housing Rental units with tenant income, and in some cases rent, restrictions 
imposed by the above programs;  Subsidized households refer to the 
households that occupy those units 
 
 
 
Appendix G: Table of affordable housing strategies implemented in New 
Orleans 
Source: Plyer, Alison.  et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖  Greater 
New Orleans Community data Center and The Urban Institute.  November 2009.   
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